@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet — The security gate for DSH plugins

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🔗 dsh.so plugin submission & security-report pages run vet-led scanning — view

🌐 Landing site: https://wulun811.github.io/dsh-plugin-vet/ — features, architecture, live dashboard numbers, trust boundaries and known limitations (bilingual, dark mode). Source in site/.

Audit before install, guard at runtime. Run every DSH plugin through dsh-plugin-vet before mounting it: static rules produce a verdict (deterministic, unforgeable), the agent investigates sensitive points and quality issues following the vet-audit-protocol skill (no one can substitute for that), and a final scorecard is handed to a human/model to decide.

Positioning: a monitoring alarm, not an enforcer. vet only does "check → alarm → advise": checks at write time (static scan), watches at run time (runtime guard), and surfaces alarms (scorecard + GUI shield status light). In the default configuration vet never acts on your behalf — it never auto-uninstalls, never kills processes, never rewrites configs, and blocks nothing. Interception exists only in explicit, documented scopes: the N7 confirmation block wakes together with the runtime guard (confirmBlock — credential-file deletion/overwrite and post-confirmation destructive ops throw once runtimeGuard: watch is on, incl. when the hardened tier or the shield toggle enables it), and deny mode / the paranoid tier roll back plugin loads and block per threshold. Every interception scope is deployer-visible and documented below; none is part of the default product identity. The final disposition is always decided by the user on their own DSH.

@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet is the trust-layer plugin in the deepseek-harness ecosystem: it occupies the whole download → scan → audit → score → decide → runtime watch trust pipeline. The runtime watch ships built-in honeypot lures: anyone quietly rifling through key files gets caught red-handed (opt-in, honeypot.enabled). It does not provide a plugin marketplace itself (catalog/distribution).

Screenshots

• 📚 Architecture: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md
• 🧾 Audit protocol: AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md
• 🛡️ Security policy: SECURITY.md
• 🤝 Contributing: CONTRIBUTING.md

Notable changes since 0.1.x

If you're upgrading from 0.1.12 or earlier, here's what changed:

• 0.1.13-0.1.15: Landed the NEXT-GEN-PLAN (N1-N6): hidden capability detection (N1), upgrade behavioral diff (N6), anti-obfuscation decoding, environment snapshot tamper-proofing.
• 0.1.16: Security hardening batch: bundle-ized entry (C1, closes the require(absolute-path) attack surface), ESM blind-spot explicit coverage (C2), content-baseline integrity (M7).
• 0.1.17-0.1.19: Bug fixes and noise reduction: npm pack integrity check, rc.8 subpath entryName handling, session-log deletion silence, DSH install-tree exemption widened.
• 0.1.20: Defense statistics panel (see how many plugins you've protected), startup file existence check, esm-guard-coverage dedup, upgrade-cold linked to audit records, red upgrade-diff now tells you to re-run audit protocol.
• 0.1.21: Self-scan trust annotation — when vet itself is scanned (scan_plugin target=package, self-dogfooding on dsh.so), the result now carries a selfScan Trusted card instead of raw radar-style criticals: declaration-bound capability downgrade (only declared capability tokens are exempted; any undeclared outbound host / env var / credential path / IPC primitive stays red), per-version artifact pin (vet-self-pins.json, publish-bound — upgrades don't false-flag and swapped bytes fail the pin), and a publish gate rejecting releases with used-but-undeclared capabilities. The raw scan (all findings) stays fully visible. Details: docs/ARCHITECTURE.md §5.12. round-16 additions: the pin now covers the shipped artifact (lib/** + root manifests + docs/**) so production installs (tarball = lib only) reach Trusted instead of being permanently dev-tree, and byte-matching any published pin counts as pinned-match — the upgrade window no longer makes two vet instances distrust each other; official @deepseek-ai/* packages are now statically scanned even on first-seen (only deny escalation is exempted — the hash baseline alone cannot stop name-spoofed tarballs).

If you were only using static scans before, enabling runtimeGuard: watch now gives you the full defense stack: T1 sentinel (memory/fd/child-process monitoring) + T2 hooks (fs/child_process/network interception) + N7 confirmation blocking.

Installation

dsh plugin --profile <profile> add @jieai/dsh-plugin-vet

Install-and-activate chain: pnpm install → reconcilePlugins reads dsh.bundle → on next start loadProfile resolves the bundle and mounts the plugin. Default configuration is in the Config section below (fail-open in the default configuration: reports only, blocks nothing — interception wakes only with explicit config, see confirmBlock / mode / the hardened-and-above tiers below).

Local tarball install (offline or verify-before-release scenario):

dsh plugin --profile <profile> add ./jieai-dsh-plugin-vet-<version>.tgz
# or unpack directly into the profile's node_modules:
# tar -xzf jieai-dsh-plugin-vet-<version>.tgz -C ~/.dsh/profiles/<profile>/node_modules/@jieai/
// and add an insert mount entry in the profile's cordis.patch.yml:
//   - insert:
//       - id: plugin-vet
//         name: '@jieai/dsh-plugin-vet'
//         config:
//           mode: report
//           autoScan: true

Paths / relative paths / URLs all work (dsh plugin add falls back to pnpm's file: protocol; a local tgz is resolved directly).

First-install time note: the first dsh plugin add into a large profile can take several minutes — during that time pnpm does a full dependency resolution, updates the lockfile for 500+ packages and runs supply-chain policy validation over the whole dependency tree (vet itself carries only 3 runtime dependencies; the bulk of the time is parsing/validating the profile's existing tree, not vet). Subsequent installs/updates take seconds (validation results are reused).

Compatibility: vet targets DSH 0.1.0-rc.6+ (peers: @deepseek-ai/cordis ^4.0.1, dsh-* ^0.1.1-rc.1; verified against npm-public 0.1.1-rc.2 in round-15 and re-verified in the follow-up review). pnpm may warn about unmet peer dependencies — this is expected: profile templates set autoInstallPeers: false, and at runtime the packages resolve from the DSH install closure ($DSH_HOME/profiles/node_modules fallback layer); you neither need nor should install another copy of the cordis family in the profile.

npm-public DSH (0.1.1-rc.2+): a profile loads plugins from dsh.profile.bundles in the profile's package.json (boot composes bundle layers + cordis.patch.yml + $DSH_HOME/cordis.patch.yml). After dsh plugin add, add the package name to that bundle list (or insert it with a patch - insert: row) — otherwise the package is installed but not mounted. vet's config block uses the same row-id form (- id: plugin-vet / config: …). Guarded paths/tests are unchanged.

Watch scope = the profile vet is installed into. vet's guards are in-process events (internal/plugin) — whichever profile vet is installed into is the one whose loaded plugins it guards. For multi-profile deployments, install vet into every profile you want guarded (dsh plugin --profile <name> add @jieai/dsh-plugin-vet) and point requireAudit at the matching profile's cordis.patch.yml.

Config (cordis.yml)

Official @deepseek-ai/* packages are exempt by default (built-in trust).

Safety tiers (0.3)

profile preset-expands into the existing per-knob config — a deployment-strategy layer, not a second parallel config system. Three principles:

1. Tiers never change verdict semantics — the verdict is produced only by the deterministic static layer (trust boundaries 1/4); tiers only change observation depth, alarm surface, and block scope.
2. Explicit beats preset — keys the user set to a non-default value survive; keys written into the vet entry of the profile cordis.patch.yml (e.g. the shield's runtime-guard toggle) count as explicit and are never overridden. Known boundary: a key explicitly set to its default value via the plugin config section is indistinguishable from unset and gets the preset applied — the patch is the true explicit channel for "off".
3. False-positive cost scales with the tier — higher tiers trade noise for coverage (see cost column).

observeLoopback is on for all tiers (0.3): its signal is specific enough (loopback + control-plane path + third-party attribution; official attribution exempt) that the unattended P15/P16/P17/G-2/G-5 family is back on the alarm surface at zero user action.

The shield panel has a one-tap tier selector (writes the patch via /vet/profile, preserving other config keys) and a tier explainer inside the ? help panel — no manual config editing needed; the runtime guard flips immediately and is persisted to the profile patch, the remaining tier-preset expansion keys apply after a DSH restart/hot-reload.

0.3.1 binding (guard ↔ tier): the defense tier and the runtime guard are no longer two independent knobs — Light defense ⇔ guard off; Medium/High defense ⇔ guard on. Pressing "enable guard" raises the tier to Medium (an already-High setting is never downgraded); pressing "disable guard" returns to Light; selecting a tier switches the guard immediately (the remaining preset-expansion keys apply on the DSH config reload — patch writes trigger the watchUserPatches hot-reload).

Environment variables

All DSH_PLUGIN_VET_* paths are snapshotted at module load (vet loads before third-party plugins — a plugin changing process.env afterwards cannot redirect vet's storage). Set them in the host environment (i.e. in the DSH profile/weekly launch script), not from inside a plugin.

Tools

• scan_plugin — deterministic static scan: target = dynamic-code (source string) / package (package directory) / file (single file). Returns a scorecard (verdict + staticScore + findings). The verdict is produced only by static rules. Optional scanBasis: npm (default — registry tarball artifact, R12 entry/ patch checked against the real release) / git (source-only repo, where lib/ etc. usually aren't committed — R12 entry/patch-missing findings drop to info so git-only rescan doesn't false-positive). Since 0.1.21 the scorecard's capability block also reports the R16 ghost/zombie dependency fields (declared vs imported vs installed). When vet scans itself (realpath-verified, not name-matched), the scorecard adds a selfScan trust annotation — declared-capability-token downgrade (only declared tokens are exempt; undeclared outbound/env/credential/IPC stays red) plus the per-version artifact pin (vet-self-pins.json, round-16: the pin covers the shipped lib/** artifacts so production installs reach Trusted; byte-matching any published pin counts as pinned-match) — the raw findings stay fully visible.
• vet_diff — read-only, purely local: prints the stored version history of a package and the behavior diff between its last two recorded versions (N6). Outputs hosts/fsPaths/spawnCmds/imports added|removed and network/exec capability flips. No scan, no network.
• vet_label — read-only, purely local: prints the human-readable "capability nutrition label" (M2) for a package — the files it touches, the hosts / subprocesses it references, its third-party imports (capability unknown), and its network/exec capability flags, plus a summary of the last upgrade diff. Sources from the same local N6 capability history; the label represents declared (static-side) capabilities — runtime observed/dormant capabilities are the domain of the running shield. No scan, no network.
• vet-audit-protocol (skill) — audit-process protocol (AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md): the agent audits a new plugin in preset steps — scan_plugin static criteria (incl. R12 Cordis/DSH contract) → read manifest/source → verify each finding → proactively dig deeper (network/files/processes/credentials/library semantics) → contract & code-quality audit (step 4.5: entry/Config-schema consistency, error handling/synchronous blocking/resource leaks/async correctness and other "badly written" issues — statically clean ≠ worth installing) → hand-write a health record to ~/.dsh/vet/audits/<plugin>-<version>-<ts>.md using the system write capability. vet ships no audit tooling and does not investigate for the agent — it only provides the criteria and the on-disk convention.

Shield panel (0.3 revamp)

The GUI was reskinned per the OBSIDIAN MOSS GOLD design mock (dark recipe; a matching light variant ships in the same token set) and rebuilt as a layer stack — secondary panels slide out flush against the main panel's right edge (never the browser's right edge); the whole stack shifts left when space runs out — panels never overlay one another — and Esc pops layers one at a time:

Data additions (read-only, backward compatible): GET /vet/status.json gains metricsHistory (64-point trend), audit (pending/new/plugin index/honeypot) and lastUpgradeDiff; new GET /vet/plugin?name= detail endpoint; new local scan-summary store ~/.dsh/vet/scan-summaries.json written by both the auto-scan and vet-gate paths. Honest scope: radar/nutrition reflect the declared static capability surface (same discipline as vet_label); the "blocked" mark comes from the N7 family-1 list.

Automatic behavior

• internal/plugin auto-scan (autoScan: true): newly installed third-party npm packages are static-scanned on load; deny mode + verdict ≥ denyOn → load rolled back.
• Audit gate (requireAudit: true): loading a third-party plugin without a health record — report mode logs a yellow audit-required alarm (enters the /vet/status.json alarm list, plugin loads normally); deny mode rolls back the load (references vet-audit-protocol as a prompt to audit first). Records match by exact version (P-1): after a plugin upgrade the old version's record no longer authorizes the new version — re-audit is required to clear the alarm/block. Third-party only (round-17): official @deepseek-ai/* packages are governed by content-hash baseline + static scan (decision 1: first-seen/match still fully scanned, only deny escalation exempt), so DSH-bundled official plugins never fire audit-required.
• tools/execute interception: cordis_define / run_code / workflow are scanned before execution (cordis_run's real schema carries no code payload, so the guard slot stays dormant as a tripwire — if a future schema adds code/source/script payloads it is scanned immediately; zero false positives today); report mode prefixes non-clean results with VET: (clean executions don't pollute machine-readable output), deny mode blocks outright (isError).
• Runtime guard (runtimeGuard: watch) — T1/T2 observation is alarm-only; interception lives in the dedicated N7 layer below ("N7 confirmation block"):
  • T1 sentinel: a sidecar subprocess reads the host /proc every runtimeIntervalMs (VmRSS / child-process count / fd count) and streams alarm JSON lines back to the host → shield turns yellow/red.
  • T2 hooks: in-process wrappers around fs / child_process (incl. fs.promises); dangerous operations (sensitive-path writes/deletes, key-file reads, subprocesses with shell/download/exfiltration keywords, honeypot-lure touches, ~/.dsh config-root reconnaissance) are attributed via the stack to the plugin package name before alarming; official packages get full-class noise reduction via attribution (capability grant — official packages are the platform itself; their high-frequency ~/.dsh session/config/storage reads don't spam; third parties can't forge attribution). Never blocks a call. Self-harm exemptions (fixed after real-world false positives):
    • node_modules package-directory exemption: package names/inner files are public artifacts — package names containing credential/secret words are normal ecosystem (@aws-sdk/credential-provider-*, @deepseek-ai/dsh-credentials-local, etc.), and both host module resolution (require.resolve's internal realpathSync/stat of inner package.json) and vet's own scan reads touch them at high frequency, so they no longer false-positive as fs-probe; path segments before node_modules still judged normally (~/.ssh/node_modules/x still hits .ssh), and write/delete of system roots (/usr etc.) still alarms.
    • Attribution excludes vet itself: the wrapper frame is always the top of the alarm stack, and the vet root never participates in attribution mapping — host/unowned alarms are no longer pinned on vet (the alarm still fires, attributed to the real caller).
    • Toolchain temp artifacts (tsc <src>.<pid>.<uuid>.tmpdir, *.tmp, *.temp, *.swp, etc.) are auto-exempt — the secrets/credentials in their names are just source filenames being compiled; deleting them is cleanup, not destruction; parent segments still judged normally (~/.ssh/config.bak still alarms).
• GUI shield: a browser half registers into conversation.session.header.actions and polls /vet/status.json to show a green/yellow/red light + alarm count. Activation requires a dsh web restart (client-modules only scans the dsh.client declaration at startup).
  • Interaction: clickable — clicking expands the alarm panel (live metrics: memory/CPU/I-O/ child-process/fd; guard status: when off, one click writes a runtimeGuard: watch config (takes effect on restart); alarm list with severity/attribution/per-item advice; recent-scan echo, refresh, updated time), outside clicks close it; when alarms exist a count badge appears next to the shield (green/yellow/red theme color, light/dark adaptive).
  • Per-item dismiss: each alarm can be "dismissed" — display-only (no longer counts toward shield level or count), the record is kept and can be "restored"; a dismissed alarm auto-expires once the alarm stops, so a recurrence is visible again (and can be dismissed again). Dismiss state shares the alarm store's lifecycle (resets on restart). Auth boundary (P3-12 recorded): dismiss/restore only do same-origin validation (alarm-only display-layer risk — a same-origin page script could hide alarms, but records aren't deleted and nothing else is affected; acceptable within the system).
  • Display caps: the panel shows the most recent alarms (at most 20); the store is a ring buffer capped at 20, deduped per id within 60s, 24h TTL (sustained triggers naturally renew) — 100 alarms are not displayed in full, and needn't be (new alarms push out the oldest). Recent-scan echo (suspicious → yellow) also expires on the 24h TTL (P3-2: one suspicious scan no longer turns the shield permanently yellow; sustained scanning renews naturally).

Static rule table (R1-R20)

Engine pipeline additions (0.1.13): besides the rule set, the scanner now produces a per-package capability manifest (N1) — hosts/fsPaths/spawnCmds/imports/hasNetwork/hasExec extracted from source (plus R16 ghostDeps/zombieDeps dependency-consistency fields from the package.json vs node_modules audit) (declaration-side facts, never verdicts, conservative over-collection) — and runs a literal decode preprocessor (N2) that statically decodes base64 / hex / Buffer.from / String.fromCharCode / constant concatenation / template literals (all-literal arguments only, ≤4KB, ≤2 nesting layers, never executes code) and feeds the decoded text back into R13/R7/R11/R20 matching (findings carry decodedFrom and the original line for audit). Capabilities enable the cross-layer diff (see Runtime monitoring below).

Scoring model

staticScore = max(0, 100 - Σ(severity weight × hits × confidence coefficient))

verdict (the single authoritative judgment; heuristics never upgrade): critical ≥ 1 → critical; otherwise high ≥ 1 → suspicious; otherwise → clean. The verdict is produced only by the static layer: staticScore and verdict are shown separately and never merged into a single total.

Capability boundary (honest list)

Static scanning is a "speed bump + forensics layer", not a security boundary. The following is split by impact on the verdict, and the forms it explicitly does not detect are listed truthfully (all empirically verified).

Detected — verdict-level (changes the verdict)

Detected — advisory level (downgrades score only, never changes the verdict)

Runtime monitoring (when runtimeGuard: watch) — observation alarm-only; the N7 confirmation block (row below) is the only interception layer

Explicitly not detected (empirically verified)

Trust boundaries

1. The verdict is produced only by the deterministic static layer — rules are regex/AST judgments, not spoofable by prompt injection.
2. The static layer is physically isolated from plugin code — the scanner is a separate process; the AST is read-only and never eval'd.
3. Review goes through the agent protocol — the agent follows the vet-audit-protocol skill steps (static criteria first, sensitive points dug into one by one); the verdict is unaffected by the review step.
4. No single merged score — merging the verdict with subjective assessment is forbidden, to avoid polluting the verdict boundary.
5. This product is not a security boundary — positioned as a "speed bump + forensics layer" (bypassable forms in Known Limitations 1 below, aligned with DSH's official stance).
6. Fail-open by default — default mode: report; deny is explicitly enabled by the deployer.
7. Observation-first, interception explicit — the runtime guard's T1/T2 layers only watch and never kill. Interception is limited to documented scopes: the N7 confirmation-block of irreversible destruction (default confirmBlock: block families 1/2; active whenever the runtime guard is on — incl. when woken by the hardened tier or the shield toggle), and the explicitly enabled opt-in deny mode / paranoid tier (load rollback + per-threshold block). Alarms only carry advice; disposition is always left to the user on their DSH.

0.1.16 hardening batch (security review)

Fixes from the full code review (C1–C4 critical, M5–M9 major/minor, rule patches; ENGINE static-v12):

• C1 — host side is published as a single bundle (lib/index.bundle.js); guard internals (setRootIndexing/withVetSelfIo/confirmBlock/canaryStore/capabilityDiff) are closure-private and no longer ship as importable modules — an in-process plugin can no longer disable T2/N7/N4/N1 by absolute-path require. Internal state is also no longer exported by the bundle. Companion fix: package-internal resources (AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md / scanner-bin entry / T1 sidecar / self root) are now resolved form-agnostically by src/pkg-root.ts (upward package.json search + candidate existence) — the old fixed two-level .. locators broke under the bundle main and made a plain restart ENOENT on AUDIT_PROTOCOL.md.
• C2 — ESM named imports (import { readFileSync } from 'node:fs') bypass all T2 hooks by Node's interop snapshot (verified). The N1 manifest now flags this (esmNamedBuiltins) and, under runtimeGuard: watch, a yellow esm-guard-coverage notice is recorded so the coverage gap is explicit, not silent.
• C3 — DSH_PLUGIN_VET_CACHE_DIR / DSH_PLUGIN_VET_BASELINE_DIR are snapshotted at module load; in-process process.env tampering can no longer redirect stores/cache. The scanner cache verifies a host-injected random nonce on read — forged clean cache entries (verified attack) are now ignored.
• C4 — Error.prepareStackTrace/stackTraceLimit tampering is detected: attribution becomes untrustworthy → red attribution-tampered alarm + N7 family-2 credential blocks still apply via a sentinel identity.
• M5 — T2 now wraps symlink/link/chmod/chown/mkdir/mkdtemp/utimes/lutimes (+Sync, write surface) and lstat/lstatSync (probe surface).
• M6/M7/M8/M9 — R9 fork-bomb covers sync spawn variants · capability/baseline stores self-check for external overwrite (vet-store-tamper yellow) · isSensitiveFsPath matches path segments instead of substrings · sidecar kill verifies /proc/<pid>/cmdline before SIGTERM (PID-reuse protection).
• Rule patches — R2 global/indirect eval forms + require-concat folding, R3 globalThis.process.* member policy, R4 Reflect.defineProperty, R9 escaped-paren ReDoS counting, R10 prepare hook, R14 python/ruby/perl download-exec, R15 undici sinks (see Static rule table).
• Session-log rotation noise — isSessionLogFile now also recognizes sharded session files (session.jsonl.zstd.<shard>); an unattributed session-log deletion under ~/.dsh/sessions/** is downgraded from red fs-destroy to yellow (host self-maintenance can't attack itself), while an attributed deletion stays red (possible evidence destruction).

Platform Support

The one-glance matrix — what actually runs where. T1 = out-of-process sentinel (samples memory / child-process count / fd every tick and alarms); T2 = in-process hooks (interception, honeypot, GUI shield); panel = live host-metrics display (metrics.js).

macOS floor and CI: GitHub Actions retired the older hosted macOS images (12 fully gone, 13/14 on the deprecation path; macos-latest = macOS 15 Sequoia), so only modern macOS is ever CI-tested — consistent with the Node 22 floor (macOS 11+). Older macOS never crashes the guard: unparsable ps output degrades to "tick skipped", the same contract as a restricted-/proc container. Windows stays sentinel-less by design: no stock ps/lsof equivalent at comparable cost; T2 + static still guard it. Panel sampling on macOS is deliberately async snapshot-cache (TTL 4s, lsof 15s): the panel polls readHostMetrics every 5s from inside the host process, and a sync execFile there would freeze the host event loop — so reads never block, the first poll shows — and self-heals at the next. Disk-I/O (read_bytes/write_bytes) is Linux-only (no stock per-process byte counter on macOS/Windows): elsewhere the panel shows — (−1), never a fake 0. The panel also refuses to render parseable non-snapshot JSON (SEC-6 cross-origin 403 envelope, host error envelopes): poll only replaces the live snapshot when the payload matches the wire shape (level string + alarms array), so an error envelope can never paint a fake all-green shield (round-21; shape predicate shared single-source between server and client bundle).

Known Limitations

1. Static scanning is not a security boundary: obfuscated/encoded/dynamically generated code can bypass the AST rules; R6 only provides a "suspicious" signal. 1b. Source enumeration limits: internal/plugin auto-scan only recursively collects ≤6 levels deep, non-hidden (non-dot-prefixed) .js/.ts/.mjs/.cjs files — deep or hidden directories are silently unscanned (no warning); use scan_plugin(target=package) manually for a full directory scan.
2. Agent review can be prompt-injected: the verdict never comes from the review step, but the agent may miss things — the confidence field lets users know.
3. internal/plugin guard doesn't cover runtime dynamic-mount escapes: the vm path is intercepted at the call layer by the tools/execute guard.
4. R5 is code-only: ctx access in files scenarios isn't reported by default (high false-positive rate).
5. Scan duration: large plugin packages may time out and skip (R8 info); agent review proceeds per the vet-audit-protocol steps.
6. The verdict is the static layer's deterministic judgment; the agent's subjective assessment is recorded in the health record and doesn't constitute a security guarantee.
7. /vet/status.json has no auth: the shield's polling needs anonymous GET, and the route itself isn't authenticated — if dsh web binds to a non-loopback address, LAN clients can read scan conclusions/alarm targets. vet is an alarm-only observer and won't overreach into access control; if you care, keep loopback binding or trust your network (the POST guard toggle already has same-origin validation; no-Origin requests are rejected).
8. @deepseek-ai/* is trusted by default: if the official ecosystem is ever compromised, tighten this (v1 keeps the switch). scan_plugin judges official packages as generic (capability-surface downgrade) — an official-package supply-chain attack would let static downgrade mask process access (recorded, P-5; official packages are the platform itself, same policy as the internal/plugin official exemption). vet's own exemption is likewise narrowed (P-3): it now matches by name AND verifies via realpath that the target is the current vet instance — a same-name impostor package (file: install has no registry validation) is judged by the strictest plugin rules.
9. R10's known-vulnerability check depends on an OSV network query: on by default, sending "package name + exact version" to api.osv.dev (disclosed in the README config section; set osvCheck: false if you care); network failure/timeout degrades silently to skip (never false-blocks); only exact versions are queried — */>=/^/~ ranges and version-less main packages are skipped (P3-1/P3-3; round-7 fix: ^/~ no longer strip their prefix to query as exact lower bounds — the lower bound being affected while the actually installed version is already fixed would false-positive). Transitive-dependency vulnerability scanning is opt-in (transitiveDeps: true, default off) — it shells out to a locally installed upstream-radar (never auto-installed); when it isn't installed, times out, or its output shape is unexpected it degrades silently to direct-dependency-only. Independent of OSV, R16 (0.1.21, see the Static rule table) audits the local declaration↔import↔installation consistency (ghost/zombie deps) with no network.
10. R11 only recognizes fs.* forms: destructured/aliased calls (const { unlinkSync } = require('fs')) and runtime paths are missed (empirically recorded; a static boundary).
11. T1/T2 are "security cameras", not "vaults": they catch obvious mischief (memory/fork bombs, sensitive-path operations, third-party spawn) but not worker threads/native plugins/low-traffic slow exfiltration; T2 doesn't cover ESM named-import snapshots, process.binding, and other side channels. Since 0.1.16 the ESM named-import blind spot is explicit: the N1 manifest flags esmNamedBuiltins and runtimeGuard: watch records a yellow esm-guard-coverage notice instead of silent loss of coverage, and attribution tampering (Error.prepareStackTrace/stackTraceLimit) emits red attribution-tampered alarms with N7 family-2 credential blocks still enforced.
12. T2 attribution & noise reduction: stack attribution is best-effort (shared services/timers across plugins can mis-attribute); official-package spawn is not alarmed by default (capability grant).
13. Shield activation requires a dsh web restart: client-modules scans the dsh.client declaration at startup; the browser won't load the shield before the restart, but the /vet/status.json endpoint and the runtime guard (host side) take effect on restart.
14. Runtime guard is off by default (runtimeGuard: 'off'): wrapping fs/child_process carries performance and stability costs; opt-in.
15. process.kill stays high (intentional, round-7.1): kill is a side-effect member and doesn't degrade with the read-only members — but a plugin killing its own spawned child (MCP/bridge-style) is a normal capability surface (dsh-bridges tested: 98/134 cleared; the remaining highs are all process.kill in run.js/util.js). Statically distinguishing process.kill(child.pid) (pid from this package's own spawn return) from arbitrary pids needs dataflow analysis — high cost, low benefit; kept as-is, to be ruled out manually by the agent during vet-audit-protocol review (conclusion recorded in the health record).
16. Platform support: see the Platform Support matrix above — single source of truth. One-line summary: static scan, T2 hooks and the shield run everywhere (Linux/macOS/Windows); the T1 sentinel runs on Linux (/proc) and macOS 11+ (ps/lsof, fd ~every 6s, since round-19) and is explicitly skipped on other platforms including Windows; the metrics.js host panel covers macOS since round-20 (async snapshot cache — never blocks the host; disk-I/O stays Linux-only and shows —, never a fake 0); on Windows only the V8-side numbers (rss/heap/external) are real.

Development

npm run build       # scanner-bin + src compiled to lib/ + client bundle
npm run typecheck   # full tsc --noEmit (scanner / src / client)
npx vitest run      # full suite: 74 files / 1095 tests
node scripts/count-assertions.mjs   # assertion census: 2864 standalone expect() calls (+18 chain-matcher helpers; lexical scan, comments/strings excluded)
npx vitest run --coverage   # coverage report (v8 over lib/; thresholds: lines/functions/statements >= 85%, branches >= 80%; measured 89.5/93.5/89.5/84.7)
npm run check:mutants       # mutation gate (34 mutants must all be killed, 8 benign controls stay clean; per-rule kill matrix enforced)
node scripts/gen-self-pin.mjs && node scripts/check-self-contract.mjs   # artifact self-pin + release-pin match
node scripts/check-pack-integrity.mjs   # shipped-file whitelist integrity

Release gate: prepublishOnly runs build + pack-integrity + self-contract + mutant gate automatically. The full pre-release chain is: build → typecheck → vitest → check:mutants → gen-self-pin → check-self-contract → check-pack-integrity (all must be green; the pin is regenerated whenever the shipped artifacts change).

Layout: scanner-bin/ static engine (separate process); src/ plugin body (tools/guards/audit/report/guard); src/client/ GUI shield; test/ fixtures + unit tests + adversarial matrix. Architecture in docs/ARCHITECTURE.md.

License

MIT.